I always find the disproportionate concern for the criminal at the expense of the victims fascinating. People say they show compassion for the perpetrator, but it is not the perpetrator that deserves compassion but the victim(s). To show compassion for the perpetrator is false compassion and unjust.
However, more to the point: why do you believe that all retribution is necessarily unjust? That's too broad a stroke and I think the problem has to do with modern sensibilities and also with semantics, i.e., words like "retribution" have taken on very narrow and pejorative meanings. Naturally, there are instances of retribution that are evil. These are instances of cruelty motivated by pride (understood as vice) and hatred of the other, or ones which are excessively harsh in relation to the crime committed. However, not all retribution is of such a nature, and indeed inadequate or deficient punishment is evil and unjust.
Of course, we cannot know absolutely what motivates a jury or a judge, but these are third parties that ideally have no personal stake in the matter and thus not as susceptible to acting out of hatred for the offender. If the punishment is on par with the crime committed and is done out of a desire for justice, a desire to reform the offender (when applicable) and with the preservation of the juridico-social order, then there is no issue with retribution. Indeed, it is in this case a virtuous thing.
However, more to the point: why do you believe that all retribution is necessarily unjust? That's too broad a stroke and I think the problem has to do with modern sensibilities and also with semantics, i.e., words like "retribution" have taken on very narrow and pejorative meanings. Naturally, there are instances of retribution that are evil. These are instances of cruelty motivated by pride (understood as vice) and hatred of the other, or ones which are excessively harsh in relation to the crime committed. However, not all retribution is of such a nature, and indeed inadequate or deficient punishment is evil and unjust.
Of course, we cannot know absolutely what motivates a jury or a judge, but these are third parties that ideally have no personal stake in the matter and thus not as susceptible to acting out of hatred for the offender. If the punishment is on par with the crime committed and is done out of a desire for justice, a desire to reform the offender (when applicable) and with the preservation of the juridico-social order, then there is no issue with retribution. Indeed, it is in this case a virtuous thing.