I've seen a similar failure in a van. The van was equipped with antilock brakes, which override the driver's control input and reduce braking force when the speed sensors on one or more wheels detect that the wheel has stopped too suddenly, as if skidding. One of the sensors had malfunctioned, resulting in an "ABS" warning light, and a fault code readable with a tool indicating which sensor was malfunctioning.
Did it disable the ABS? No. Instead, it continued to rely on the faulty sensor information, activating ABS under moderate deceleration on dry pavement, greatly reducing the available braking force and creating a severe danger.
I think there may be a bias among people designing safety equipment to always try to provide the intended safety benefit, even when part of the system isn't working. The problem is it's easy to lose sight of how the safety feature fits into the overall picture. A pilot can almost always safely fly a plane that doesn't use automation to recover from a stall, but not necessarily one that uses the trim to point the nose at the ground in spite of control inputs to the contrary.
Did it disable the ABS? No. Instead, it continued to rely on the faulty sensor information, activating ABS under moderate deceleration on dry pavement, greatly reducing the available braking force and creating a severe danger.
I think there may be a bias among people designing safety equipment to always try to provide the intended safety benefit, even when part of the system isn't working. The problem is it's easy to lose sight of how the safety feature fits into the overall picture. A pilot can almost always safely fly a plane that doesn't use automation to recover from a stall, but not necessarily one that uses the trim to point the nose at the ground in spite of control inputs to the contrary.