Hacker Newsnew | past | comments | ask | show | jobs | submitlogin

"You can just opt out" is the same tired line that in former times Mozilla has fought against.

It's extremely hard to keep track of and manage "opt outs", especially in a household with multiple computers and multiple people.

Formerly, I "opted out" of having a browser that phoned home my browsing traffic by using Firefox.



> Formerly, I "opted out" of having a browser that phoned home my browsing traffic by using Firefox.

Formerly your browser still "phoned home" to your default DNS provider, using an insecure protocol.

I appreciate your concerns but, unless you run your own DNS server, you have to trust someone at some point.


I trust my own DNS provider much more than I trust Cloudflare to be honest. Also, most DNS requests over that “insecure protocol” happened over a single network hop or two and never left the infrastructure of the ISP.

Cloudflare is now a public company and they need to aggressively monetize their services. Selling browsing data is a lucrative business and becoming “the” DNS provider for most users (while locking out all other players) is a great way to build a data monopoly.

Not to mention that being the number one DNS provider will give them many opportunities to break domain resolution for users that don’t use their DoH service, as they also control the DNS entries for many sites (they could e.g. make propagation via normal DNS slower or start providing only a limited set of entries over “insecure” DNS).


American ISPs can and do sell your data legally. I don't really trust my ISP (I run my own DNS server at home and tunnel its requests over to a cloud VM), but I trust Cloudflare even less.


I trust my ISP but not American companies. They roll out only in America but obviously it's coming, and they use locale to detect it? My locale is set to en_US too, surely I'm not alone doing it because of translated software. Firefox has a small market in America anyway and America is not the world. We know big tech is in bed with your three letter agencies.


"Legally" is dubious. Intercepting any private wire communication is a clear violation of federal law (e.g. 18 U.S. Code § 2511), and a violation of the law in many states (e.g. CA PC 631).

Unfortunately, the US government is one of the larger users of ISP surveillance activities, benefiting through the purchase of private data as well as using administrative subpoena to obtain the data collected by ISPs without due process or meaningful oversight.

This creates a conflict of interest which I believe is preventing the US from zealously enforcing existing criminal law which would be otherwise sufficient to significantly reduce surveillance by communications providers.


Are you sure about that? This passed in 2017 and I don't think it's been reversed:

http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll202.xml


Hm. FCC getting a ruling overturned that strengthens the law doesn't change the existing law, however.


Wow, that's one polarized vote…


I dont use my ISP as my DNS provider, I have a custom setup using PiHole and other methods to provide secure DNS Resolution

Firefox should not be forcing this shit on me, time to search for yet another browser that will respect users. Mozilla is clearly more interested in commercial viability via their partnerships with large corporations (like CloudFlare) then in protecting Users


The only way to solve the ISP DNS inspection problem is by one of:

* Using DoH. For this to work with PiHole, you need to have a DoH resolver on the device, and then instruct the PiHole to recurse to that resolver instead - possibly your own in a VM somewhere?

* Using a permanent encrypted VPN to your own machine in the cloud and routing all DNS through that, then recursing to some DNS that you trust.

* Write your own encrypted protocol that communicates with some machine in the cloud.

Anything else and your ISP/evil-state-actor is able to to see your DNS traffic in plain-text. PiHole and DoH approach the problem at different OSI layers, you ideally need both.


>>Anything else and your ISP/evil-state-actor is able to to see your DNS traffic in plain-text

and you believe CloudFlare is not a "evil state actor" or has not been compromised or never will be compromised by an "evil state actor"

Wow your faith in CloudFlare is much much higher than mine

Personally I trust my current ISP (which is not one of the big boys) more than I trust CloudFlare.

I do not trust cloudflare at all and believe they are the are one of the biggest threats to the future of open web there is today.


Cloudflare aren't the only people running a DoH endpoint


DNS over TSL (DoT) is a much better alternative to DoH, at least when it comes to the ability to be tracked.

For example, because it’s not using HTTP, there are no cookies or SNI to worry about.

More at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22418005.


> DNS over TSL (DoT) is a much better alternative to DoH, at least when it comes to the ability to be tracked.

> For example, because it’s not using HTTP, there are no cookies or SNI to worry about.

> More at https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=22418005.

The fact that it can be trivially blocked by anyone on the network path does not make it "much better".


The fact that it can be trivially blocked by anyone on the network path does not make it "much better".

Of course anyone on the "network path" can block almost any protocol; DoT isn’t unique in that regard.

The concern is many large businesses block port 853 but that's because prior to the development of DoT, there was no reason for IT departments to configure firewalls to enable it. Most organizations only have a handful of ports available, including 443, which is what HTTPS uses and therefore DoH works as a result.

I've been running DNS over TLS using the Unbound [1] resolver for my home LAN on a spare laptop for a few weeks now and it’s been great.

Given the privacy trade-offs between privacy and security, many IT departments would opt to make port 853 available for DoT rather than increasing the ability for their users to be tracked.

As I mentioned elsewhere in this thread, the article Centralised DoH is bad for Privacy, in 2019 and beyond [2] clearly describes the issues with DoH:

DNS over HTTPS opens up DNS to all the tracking possibilities present in HTTPS and TLS. As it stands, DNS over UDP almost always gets some free privacy by mixing all devices on a network together – an outside snooper sees a stream of queries coming from a household, a coffeeshop or even an entire office building, with no way to tie a query to any specific device or user. Such mixing of queries provides an imperfect but useful modicum of privacy.

DNS over HTTPS however neatly separates out each device (and even each individual application on that device) to a separate query stream. This alone is worrying, as we now have individual users’ queries, but the TLS that underlies HTTPS also typically uses TLS Resumption which offers even further tracking capabilities.

[1]: https://www.ctrl.blog/entry/unbound-tls-forwarding.html

[2]: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/bert_hubert/centralised-doh-is...


DoT only solves the SNI problem during the DNS request itself. It doesn't do a thing about the SNI during the request to the actual website, which is where all the privacy concerns are.


DoT only solves the SNI problem during the DNS request itself. It doesn't do a thing about the SNI during the request to the actual website, which is where all the privacy concerns are.

Sure, but until we have encrypted SNI, which is in draft, meta data is going to leak, but that's a separate issue from either DoT or DoH.

But because DoT doesn't use HTTPS, you don't get some of its downsides like using cookies for tracking, for example.


DoH (edit from DoT) doesn't use cookies, it is stateless. But your original comment didn't mention that anyway, it only mentioned SNI.


From "The Big DNS Privacy Debate" [1]:

DoH shares the benefits and downsides of HTTPS. It sends out more trackable data than regular DNS, simply because HTTP supports things like headers and cookies. TLS session resumption functions as another tracking mechanism.

There’s a draft RFC [2] to address these and other privacy issues that weren't specified in the original RFC for DoH.

[1]: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/bert_hubert/the-big-dns-privac...

[2]: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-dickinson-doh-dohpe-00...


Is there an indication they are moving in that direction already? (Genuine non-sarcastic question)

They've built up a considerable amount of good-will in developer communities. Is there some historical indicator with cloudfare that suggests they are going to blow it all on their path to monetization, or are we extrapolating from other VC backed companies (which may be an understandable position to take, but why?)


Yes I think they will. Their positioning in the VPN, DNS, CDN and (soon) enterprise networking space will give them enormous visibility into a large fraction of what is happening on the Internet, and I simply cannot believe that a profit-oriented company will turn away from such a market opportunity.

Cloudflare isn’t really known as a privacy champion, they always put more emphasis on security, speed and reliability.

From a privacy perspective it’s pretty horrible what they do as well, because they decrypt and inspect all traffic between their customers and those customers users. Security-wise it might be great, but don’t confuse security with privacy.

I really hope that I’m wrong but I’m skeptical that Cloudflare will turn down such a big opportunity, and this move with DoH really seems to confirm this.


Mozilla has previously noted that Cloudfare is contractually obligated to keep the traffic private and not monetize or share it. That's not perfect, but without a law requiring it that's about the best you can get in the U.S. (assuming the contract has teeth in the penalties it imposes).


I'd be willing to accept a lien on the homes of the senior cloudflare and mozilla executives with a contract that will forfeit the value of their homes and allow me to sell them and donate the funds to charity, should it be demonstrated that Firefox-Cloudflare DoH is being used to surveil users.

There are many things that could be done. The problem is that the promises they make sound grand but aren't real, they wouldn't put the value of their homes at risk (nor would I encourage them to, I'd encourage them to not put themselves in a position where they could be forced to compromise the privacy of the public like this) ---- yet some user's lives can be put at risk by privacy-failures of their service.


That would certainly give a new meaning to "we take security seriously" -- one I would also love to see!


That is pointless, Contracts are only valid if they have teeth, and I highly doubt CloudFlare agreed to any contract that exposes them to huge financial liability

So the question is "What happens when CloudFlare violates the contract" do they get a strongly worded email from Mozilla?

bad PR?

Or is it s bankruptcy causing event for the company. Anything besides that means the contract is worthless


It's interesting how bubbles work.

In my world, everyone has a story about how an obscure but interesting to surveil service that they were involved with was DDOS attacked and immediately cloudflare sales was showing up offering to mitigate the attack for free by MITMing their traffic. ... Even showing up on the IRC channels of open source projects. I've personally witnessed it three times.

Even if it weren't for the fact that it would be gross incompetence if the NSA hadn't compromised cloudflare up, down, and sidewise since it's such an attractive target, the surveillance based sales-leads approach used by cloudflare has convinced a lot of people that they're engaging in a protection racket. Not just technies, either-- I've heard from executives who pay for cloudflare service that they think is a protection racket but they pay anyways because it's just a cost of doing business.

[I don't personally think it is, but I think that cloudflare is unethically creating a situation where some customers will believe this and pay as a result.]

It's such a lovely setup for a state attacker. Step 1. Compromise cloudflare (either by getting insiders into it, or by hacking them). Step 2. DDOS attack the thing you really want to monitor. Step 3. Cloudflare sales shows up and helps onboard the victim onto your borrowed surveillance platform.

People think that kind of stuff about AV companies, but at least AV companies aren't showing up within minutes of an attack saying "Gee, isn't it so terrible that you've got a virus. We've got a cure for that!". At least AV companies mostly don't send your data all back to their servers where god knows what happens to it.

Even where the problem is usually just a volumetric DDOS, the cloudflare standard solution is a full encryption unwrapping layer-7 MITM.

DoH without cloudflare would also gather complaint but the fact that the default centralized panoptiresolver is cloudflare contributes a lot to many people's discomfort.

So, I don't think cloudflare has amassed much goodwill at all, and that's even before getting into how their 'protection' made much of the internet unusable behind tor or other anonymization proxies.


> So, I don't think cloudflare has amassed much goodwill at all, and that's even before getting into how their 'protection' made much of the internet unusable behind tor or other anonymization proxies.

Funnily enough Cloudflare supports DNS over Tor[1][2], and I think they are the only one. Please let me know if there are others!

[1] https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/fun-stuff/dns-over...

[2] https://blog.cloudflare.com/welcome-hidden-resolver/


That's pretty cool!


Yeah, really hoping someone else will come along and give me alternatives though. Cloudflare is a bit iffy.


This is the most convoluted conspiracy theory I've read so far this decade.

You profess not to believe these theories, or at least not the first one. So why then repeat? It's just more untruths poisoning this debate, like any other going on these days.

And how does Cloudflare get the blame in your telling of this story, when it's your unnamed sources "you've heard" believing paranoid stories? DDOS were a thing before Cloudflare, and the incident numbers haven't much changed. So if it's Cloudflare doing it all now, they must have simultaneously convinced everyone else to stop.

The idea that their salespeople showing up when you're under attack is similarly strange: While I might agree that it feels somewhat creepy, is there any doubt that these things are easy to notice with some saved twitter searches and a google alert? It also strikes me as a potentially quite useful sales tactic. And yet, even though it's feasible and effective, they are supposed to forgo that channel to stop others from engaging in obviously flawed reasoning?


> This is the most convoluted conspiracy theory I've read so far this decade.

You must not get out much. :)

> things are easy to notice with some saved twitter searches and a google alert?

They are not doing this through twitter searches or google alerts. They show up when there is absolutely no mention of it anywhere, even sometimes when the attack is largely ineffective. Expectations like yours-- that they could only discover them from public sources-- probably contributes to people believing the attacks originate from cloudflare.

They use sampled netflow data from ISP to detect large scale DDOS attacks (presumably buying the information from arbor networks or similar, where they don't have their own coverage).


Pre Snowden you might have had a point.


My domestic IPS is owned by a public company and I'm sure they need to aggressively monetize their services too. My point was just that you ultimately have to trust someone. Not trusting CloudFlare is a perfectly legitimate position to take.


If Cloudflare sells their customer data then wont they be sued by Mozilla for breach of contract?


>Formerly your browser still "phoned home" to your default DNS provider, using an insecure protocol.

This is kinda painful to read, to the point where I'm not sure if it's intentionally misleading;

DHCP will give you a DNS config, that DNS server can be local, remote, it can support DNSSEC or DNS over TLS (yes, that's a thing[0]). I even have configurations where a local DNS resolver on my machine (DNSMasq/unbound) would query _different_ recursive resolvers based on the domain I'm requesting.

DoH takes away huge amounts of configuration, and the ability to locally host DNS and ensures that a central body gets your DNS requests. The only "opt-out" in the current system is not using DNS at all, which is still an option. (NETBIOS/mDNS/Hosts)

[0]: https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/docs/dns-over...


I think this is an unfair response.

> DHCP will give you a DNS config

So in other words "your default dns provider"

> that DNS server can be local, remote

Maybe a nitpick but i doubt dhcp is going to hive you a local dns server

> it can support DNSSEC

Which is irrelevent to the original complaint about "phoning home". DNSSec provides security against certain types of attacks like poisioning. Privacy & evesdropping are outside of its threat model

> DNS over TLS (yes, that's a thing[0]).

A thing with very little client support. Is it even possible to specify this via dhcp?

> DoH takes away huge amounts of configuration, and the ability to locally host DNS and ensures that a central body gets your DNS requests.

If you're doing this level of configuration, just disable DoH. Or host your own DoH server.


> Maybe a nitpick but i doubt dhcp is going to hive you a local dns server

Nearly every consumer-grade router on the market hands out IP configurations where said router is configured as a DNS server (the router then usually is configured to forward requests to the DNS provider of your choice, which is usually the ISP's DNS servers, depending on the technical ability of the person that set the router up). This is useful for things like accessing devices on your local network that have a GUI accessible via a web browser by hostname rather than IP address or, in the case of Netgear, intercepting requests to routerlogin.net and redirecting them to the router's configuration page instead of some page on the Internet.

If FireFox starts to ignore the OS-level DNS configuration, then these things are going to break and consumers who don't follow these things closely aren't going to know why or how to fix it.


> Maybe a nitpick but i doubt dhcp is going to hive you a local dns server

0_o Weird doubt,-- thats why DHCP can give you a DNS server. Otherwise, DNS discovery might as well work by just defining some /32s that always get routed to a nearby DNS server. :)

My DHCP servers at home give me a local DNS server... any corporate network that also has internal private naming will necessarily be handing out a resolver internal to that network.


I guess i was interpreting local in the sense of localhost. Which, fair enough, in context that is a silly way to interpret local as local network makes much more sense in context.


Ok. Would you accept "_potentially_ insecure protocol" then? DNSSEC for example provides no encryption.

fwiw I agree with you about a central body getting all out DNS requests.


The problem is this language spreads FUD around DNS and then offers a “solution” with additional problems.


> you have to trust someone at some point.

Give me a non-profit infra provider than I can donate to, similar to Let's Encrypt. Let's call it "Let's Resolve", give it a non-profit charter and org style, with transparency, governance, and strong privacy protections. Mozilla could even be one of the sponsors of such an org, thereby ensuring the values it supports are adhered to.

Open Street Map runs on a budget of ~$100k a year. The costs for such an org would be similar; DNS->DoH VMs, orchestration, labor, admin. I've warmed to Cloudflare, but you know how things usually go with for profit benevolence. The love always runs out. Always. And that's okay! Nothing lasts forever, but we need to start putting effort into orgs that are designed to last while protecting user citizens. Build trust, not companies.


Quad9 (https://www.quad9.net/) exists and is a 501(c)(3) DNS provider with a relatively reasonable privacy policy. It supports direct DNS resolving and has DOH servers available.

The problem is not so much the lack of available infrastructure but the lack of awareness of alternatives existing, so everyone ends up just using the known defaults (google or cloudflare mostly)


Brilliant. Tremendous this exists already. Someone get this to Mozilla!


I'm dubious. If someone asked me to run such a thing and offered to pay for it, I'd turn them down:

It's too easy to be compromised (via hackers, including the state funded kind) or ordered (e.g. via an administrative subpoena, NSL, or plain court order) and fail to deliver on the expected privacy. This false sense of security might even get people killed, when they think their activities are private when they really aren't.

You might get a strong selection effect for parties who are less principled, thoughtful, knowledgeable, or even outright less honest. Why should someone trust them more than cloudflare (who is already seeing a substantial portion of user traffic, because if you don't use them-- you get DDOS attacks and then mysteriously cloudflare sales contacting you).

The situation with Let's Encrypt is different-- the SSL CA process is already fairly insecure and bogus certs are already easily issued to any party that can MITM traffic to the target server. Even ignoring that ... Any one rogue CA which is trusted by browsers is enough. So there is little to no incentive to compromise Let's Encrypt.


If someone asked me to run such a thing and offered to pay for it, I would do so in a heartbeat (build, staff, and move on). You don't get progress without pragmatism and compromise. The benefits far outweigh the potential downside. You want people who care leading the charge.

We should endeavor to build something good enough today, so someone in the future can build something better on our shoulders.


Parent post already covered this in the original comment: the ISP can already see all IPs and often SNI. Basically they still see the host names. DoH is just adding an extra party to that chain.

I’m not taking sides here but the argument was made, and valid.


Even if you run your own DNS server, it's still making queries to other DNS servers. With regular DNS, this is not encrypted, of course. Almost nobody uses DNSSEC. So there's a lot of "trust" going on.


Firefox choosing reasonable defaults that improve security for regular users in practise given the state of the world at this time, seems reasonable to me.

By a similar token, you can opt-out of web pki by specifying all your own root CA's. But i hardly fault firefox for including sensible defaults.




Guidelines | FAQ | Lists | API | Security | Legal | Apply to YC | Contact

Search: