But Pinephone's switches are not easily accessible: You can't switch your microphone on while receiving a call (unlike on Librem 5). Also, no lockdown mode for sensors.

IMO: the software on the PinePhone is significantly more trustworthy than most devices (as long as you're not careless or install non-free apps.) The switches are there more for the sake of completeness but I would just as soon trust muting the microphone in pavucontrol.

It depends on your threat model.

someone should just 3d print a back case for the pinephone that exposes them. Or better, instruct on how to cut the current case, and 3d print a lever system that matches the hole, for easily action on the switches from outside.

> someone should just 3d print a back case for the pinephone that exposes them.

I have a Pinephone. Those switches are very tiny and probably not designed for everyday switching, even if you connect them to larger ones.

You can't really trust HW switches either. Someone who has physical control over the phone for a while can easily short the switch so that it's basically on all the time no matter the position. (they can do it at the same time they'll be installing the SW backdoor)

;)

It might be meant as a joke but I am so tired of every comment that seems to imply that trying to do anything is pointless:

Yes, a significantly advanced adversary can always get your communications if they want, but every time someone does choose the more secure option it raises the bar for them.

What's the point of security measures if you just dismiss their weak points?

"FBI is comming for me, but I have my HDD encrypted..." Well, how well did HDD encryption serve that guy who the FBI just pulled the turned on/unlocked notebook from before he noticed what's going on and was able to react? He might just as well not bothered, when he knew "FBI" is in his threat model, and didn't account for this obvious attack in any real way.

It is about the tone of the message.

If you had instead written something along the lines of "for those who have mighty adversaries and who actually need this for their own security, one should be aware that things like hardware switches only go so far" and then an explanation.

Instead you wrote it in a way that I and probably a lot of others took to mean: even hardware switches doesn't matter.

> Someone who has physical control over the phone for a while

So you shouldn't give your phone to anyone you do not trust?

(Also, AFAIK, you can simply reinstall all software yourself.)

If using trusted software is enough, then HW switches are pointless anyway.

Nothing is "enough". It's defense in depth.

>Wish the hardware was better

Well I have good news for you

https://www.pine64.org/2021/10/15/october-update-introducing...

Well that's great news!

Sadly, the camera is still a potato, relatively speaking, compared to ie Pixel 6 Pro or S21 Ultra.

And the camera is pretty much the main criteria of choosing a phone for me, because I like the outdoors a lot, and I take many photos (and I can't get myself to carry around a 'real' camera - or getting into that whole topic.)

The switches don't disable the accelerometer and magnetometer.

> Wish the hardware was better.

Same here, the hardware is really underwhelming.