AQ affiliates literally cannot be "military combatants", even were that a meaningful term; there is no "military" for them to be associated with. The state-sanctioned killing of non-military persons is definitionally execution. That we apply this to people who may or may not have committed crimes (and, let's be honest with ourselves, "may not" is no less likely given the vague targeting used by our military forces) with no oversight or due process is 'unlawful execution' from where I stand.
We will someday answer for the evil we currently perpetuate in Afghanistan. If we are moral, we will be the ones holding ourselves to task for it. I doubt that we are of sufficient fiber.
Look, the executive branch is empowered by Congress to engage in military action against Al Qaeda by the AUMF. You may not like this, but since it's been in place for >11 years now perhaps you could make your argument in the context of the existing legal framework. For example, if you think the AUMF is unconstitutional you could argue that, or if you think it is constitutional but the executive's actions are outside the scope of the AUMF you could tell us why. I don't see how we can discuss this meaningfully without agreeing on some terms of reference.
In any reasonable situation what these people are allegedly doing would be grounds for trying them for treason, for which they could be executed. We are skipping the "pesky" catching/trial step because we find it inconvenient.
Now yeah, everyone is saying that expecting people to arrest others in a military engagement is crazy... but what is happening here can hardly be called military engagements. These killings are not taking place in the heat of a firefight, they are meticulously planned with the sole objective of killing the target.
Any reasonable man outside a court of law would call these executions. Execution by missile, without a trial.
These killings are not taking place in the heat of a firefight, they are meticulously planned with the sole objective of killing the target.
You could make the same argument about the use of snipers or bombers. As far back as the siege of Troy, there were arguments about whether the use of archery qualified as a legitimate form of combat since arrows could be shot from beyond the range of normal hand-to-hand combat.
There is no legal requirement that military engagement be limited to pitched battle or that combatants must meet in the field on equal terms. An interesting historical example (that I may have suggested you read up on before) is the ambush on Admiral Yamamamoto during WW2.
I don't understand this comparison. Yamamoto was at the time of his death an instrumental component of one of the largest military threats the US ever faced. Cukurs was decades out of the military when he was assassinated. Yamamoto was killed to degrade the combat effectiveness of a combatant army. Cukurs was killed purely for revenge.
I agree, in that I think the available evidence suggests that some of the killings have been reasonable in the context of military operations, and others have been haphazard, negligent, or poorly justified.
Of course, that's the way of all wars. Drone killings are alien to us and thus easy to fret about, but far worse things happen when you put troops on the ground. Scared teenagers have done far worse in good faith efforts to take down well-conceived targets than drones are likely ever to do.
You'd hope that people would take away the right lesson from this; not "US citizenship is a sacred talisman of safety in war zones", but that we shouldn't be declaring idiotic wars against enemies that almost by definition can't be "defeated".
I don't think we really disagree on anything in this case then. I have no particular issue if Americans happen to be killed by Americans in normal circumstances.
Killings outside of what could reasonably be considered a warzone continues to concerns me, American or otherwise (though American particularly, if I am honest).
I don't share those, and think he is ducking the issue by saying the memo improperly seeks justification for its geographical reach in Hamdan. Rather, it acknowledges the lack of clear guidance and develops a a legal theory based upon the history of hostilities launched by one party to a conflict from inside a neutral third country (Vietnam and Cambodia) and the executive intent of the signatories to the Geneva Conventions (as suggested by Corn & Jensen).
I'd like you to consider the possibility that some questions are not easily justiciable (that is, decidable by the judiciary), and this is why the Supreme Court sometimes declines to take up an issue on the grounds that it is a 'political question'; one for which there are no clear legal rules and the matter must ultimately be left to the approval of the citizenry via the electoral process.
I am well aware of Yamamoto's killing. Allow me to refer you to the killing of Herberts Cukurs.
But this exemplifies what's wrong with your argument. Cukurs was killed because of something he was judged to have don ein the past. There was no question of his attempting to continue his Holocaust-era activities. Al-Awlaki, by contrast, was actively fomenting war against the US by his own public statements.
What's a "battlefield"? World War 2 was fought all across the cities and suburbs of Europe. It's been centuries since people flew banners and lined up to whack each other in the heads with halberds in an orderly fashion.
The sniper is at his post near a military base. He sees a heavily loaded van approaching at high speed. The driver is ignoring the warning signs and shouts from the guards. The sniper shoots the diver. The truck is found to be loaded with explosives.
Did the sniper execute his target, or fire the first and only shot of a battle?
