> As terrible as the Columbia accident was, I think this approach (with so many checks skipped to get Atlantis up as quick as possible) would have ended in the loss of both crews & orbiters.
Agreed. The article touches on the fact that the Columbia disaster has its roots in decisions that were made far in advance of its final launch. Not that this excuses what happened, but I almost wonder if the reason the photographs of the damage were never taken ("miscommunication") was that the people involved knew there was no possibility of rescue, so better to not know and hope for the best.
The Wikipedia article on the disaster[1] strongly suggests that this kind of fatalism had permeated the culture:
Throughout the risk assessment process, senior NASA managers were influenced by their belief that nothing could be done even if damage were detected. This affected their stance on investigation urgency, thoroughness and possible contingency actions. They decided to conduct a parametric "what-if" scenario study more suited to determine risk probabilities of future events, instead of inspecting and assessing the actual damage. The investigation report in particular singled out NASA manager Linda Ham for exhibiting this attitude. In 2013, Hale recalled that Director of Mission Operations John Harpold told him before Columbia's destruction:
"You know, there is nothing we can do about damage to the TPS [Thermal Protection System]. If it has been damaged it's probably better not to know. I think the crew would rather not know. Don't you think it would be better for them to have a happy successful flight and die unexpectedly during entry than to stay on orbit, knowing that there was nothing to be done, until the air ran out?"
Hale added, "I was hard pressed to disagree [at the time]. That mindset was widespread. Astronauts agreed. So don't blame an individual; look for the organizational factors that lead to that kind of a mindset. Don't let them in your organization."
Agreed. The article touches on the fact that the Columbia disaster has its roots in decisions that were made far in advance of its final launch. Not that this excuses what happened, but I almost wonder if the reason the photographs of the damage were never taken ("miscommunication") was that the people involved knew there was no possibility of rescue, so better to not know and hope for the best.